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1
Under pay-as-you-go social security systems, most developed countries
have made promises they can’t keep. The systems in their current forms are
not ﬁnancially sustainable. What caused this problem? It has been com-
mon to assume that the problem was caused by aging populations. The per-
centage of older persons has increased very rapidly relative to the number
of younger persons and this trend will continue (see ﬁgure I.1).1 Thus, the
proportion of retirees has increased relative to the number of employed
persons who must pay for the beneﬁts of those who are retired. In addition,
persons are living longer, so that those who reach retirement age are re-
ceiving beneﬁts longer than they used to. The combined eﬀect of aging
populations and increasing longevity has been compounded by another
trend: older persons are leaving the labor force at younger and younger
ages, further increasing the ratio of retirees to employed persons (see ﬁgure
I.2). What has not been widely appreciated is that the provisions of social
security programs themselves often provide strong incentives to leave the
labor force. By penalizing work, social security systems magnify the in-
creased ﬁnancial burden caused by aging populations and thus contribute
to their own insolvency.
Several years ago we began an international project to study the rela-
tionship between social security program provisions and retirement. This
volume presents the results of the third phase of the project. The ﬁrst phase
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1. In this ﬁgure, “Now” varies from country to country but is generally the early 1990s.described the retirement incentives inherent in plan provisions and docu-
mented the strong relationship across countries between social security in-
centives to retire and the proportion of older persons out of the labor force
(Gruber and Wise 1999b). The second phase illustrated the large eﬀects
that changing plan provisions would have on the labor force participation
of older workers. This third phase shows the consequent ﬁscal implications
that extending labor force participation would have on net program costs—
reduced government social security beneﬁt payments less increased gov-
ernment tax revenues.
The ﬁndings are conveyed by simulating the implications of illustrative
reforms. One reform increases beneﬁt eligibility ages by three years. An-
other actuarially reduces beneﬁts received before the normal retirement
age. A common reform prescribes the same provisions in each country. The
ﬁnancial implications of the illustrative reforms are very large in many in-
stances, often as much as 20 to 40 percent of current program costs. The
savings amount to as much as 1 percent or more of country GDP.
The results of the ongoing project are the product of analyses conducted
for each country by analysts in that country. Researchers who have partic-
ipated in the project are listed here (the authors of the country papers in
this volume are listed ﬁrst; others who participated in one of the ﬁrst two
phases are listed second and are shown in italics).
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Fig. I.1 Population 65  to population 20 to 64Belgium Raphaël Desmet, Alain Jousten, Sergio Perelman,
Pierre Pestieau, Arnaud Dellis,and Jean-Philippe Stijns
Canada Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan
Denmark Paul Bingley, Nabanita Datta Gupta, and Peder J.
Pedersen
France Emmanuelle Walraet, Ronan Mahieu, and Didier
Blanchet
Germany Axel Börsch-Supan, Simone Kohnz, Giovanni Mastro-
buoni, and Reinhold Schnabel
Italy Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi
Japan Akiko Sato Oishi, Takashi Oshio, and Naohiro
Yashiro
The Netherlands Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos
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Fig. I.2 Labor force participation (LFP) trends for men 60 to 64
A
BSpain Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco
Peracchi
Sweden Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson
United  Kingdom Richard Blundell, Carl Emmerson, Paul Johnson,
Costas Meghir, and Sarah Smith
United States Courtney Coile, Jonathan Gruber, and Peter Diamond
An important goal of the project has been to present results that were as
comparable as possible across projects. Thus the papers for each phase
were prepared according to a detailed template that we prepared in con-
sultation with country participants. In many cases the country papers con-
tain analyses in addition to those prescribed in the template, usually per-
taining to reforms or reform proposals in individual countries.
Before discussing in more detail the results of this phase of the project,
we summarize the results of the previous two phases. We give particular at-
tention to the second phase, which provides the empirical base for the anal-
ysis in this volume.
Phase I
The goal of the ﬁrst stage of this project was to describe the incentives in-
herent in the social security provisions and to relate their incentives to the
labor-force participation of older workers across nations. The core of each
Phase I paper is a detailed analysis of the retirement incentives inherent in
the provisions of that country’s retirement income system, based on a tem-
plate that described—in detail—how the incentives were to be calculated.
By making the same analytic calculations and by presenting the same sim-
ulations in each of the countries, the individual studies could provide a
means of comparing the retirement incentives among the countries. Each
of the country papers presents completely parallel labor-force (and other)
data for men and women. To simplify the exposition here, only data for
men are discussed, but the eﬀect of the social security incentives to leave
the labor force, as later discussed, appear to be at least as important for
women as for men.
Unused Labor-Force Capacity
The proportion of men out of the labor force between ages 55 and 65 in
11 countries is shown in ﬁgure I.3. The term unused labor-force capacity is
used to emphasize that incentives to induce older persons to leave the la-
bor force reduce national economic production, recognizing of course that
not all persons in these age ranges want to work or are able to work. For
the 55 to 65 age group the percentage ranges from close to 0.7 in Belgium
to about 0.2 in Japan. Subsequent results show the relationship between
social security plan provisions to leave the labor force and this measure of
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tives to retire.
Measuring Incentives to Retire
Three key features of social security systems have an important eﬀect on
labor-force participation incentives. The ﬁrst is the age at which beneﬁts are
ﬁrst available. This is called the early retirement age (ERA), or the age of
ﬁrst eligibility. Across the countries participating in this study, the ﬁrst eli-
gibility age ranges from about 53 for some employee groups in Italy to 62 in
the United States. In none of the countries in this project does a signiﬁcant
portion of persons retire before the ﬁrst eligibility age. The normal retire-
ment age (NRA)—for example, 65 in the United States—is also important,
but typically much less important than the early retirement age. In most
countries, few people currently work until the normal retirement age.
The second important feature of plan provisions, which is strongly re-
lated to the extent to which people continue to work after the early retire-
ment age—and which we emphasized in this phase of the analysis—is the
pattern of beneﬁt accrual after the age of ﬁrst eligibility. The idea can be
explained this way: consider two components of total compensation for
working an additional year. One component is current wage earnings. The
other component is the increase in future, promised social security bene-
ﬁts. Consider a person who has attained the social security early retirement
age (when beneﬁts are ﬁrst available) and suppose that person is consider-
ing whether to work for an additional year. It is natural to suppose that if
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Fig. I.3 Unused productive capacity: Men age 55 to 65beneﬁt receipt is delayed by a year, then beneﬁts—when they are re-
ceived—might be increased, to oﬀset the receipt of beneﬁts for one less
year. But in most countries this is not the case. Once beneﬁts are available,
a person who continues to work for an additional year will receive less in
social security beneﬁts over his or her lifetime than if he or she quit work
and started to receive beneﬁts at the ﬁrst opportunity. That is, the present
value of expected social security beneﬁts declines. In many countries, this
loss of social security beneﬁts can oﬀset a large fraction of the wage earn-
ings a person would receive from continued work. Thus there is an implicit
tax on work, and total compensation can be much less than net wage earn-
ings.
A bit more formally, consider the diﬀerence between the expected dis-
counted value of social security beneﬁts (social security wealth) if retire-
ment is age a   1 and the present value if retirement is at age a – SSW(a  
1) – SSW(a). This diﬀerence is called the accrual of beneﬁts between age a
and age a   1. It is this value that is often negative. If the accrual is posi-
tive, it adds to total compensation from working the additional year; if the
accrual is negative, it reduces total compensation. The ratio of the accrual
to net wage earnings is an implicit tax on earnings if the accrual is negative
and an implicit subsidy to earnings if the accrual is positive. Thus a nega-
tive accrual discourages continuation in the labor force and a positive ac-
crual encourages continued labor force participation. This accrual rate,
and the associated tax rate, is one of the key calculations that was made in
the same way for each of the countries. As it turns out, the pension accrual
is typically negative at older ages: continuation in the labor force means a
loss in the present discounted value of pension beneﬁts, which imposes an
implicit tax on work and provides an incentive to leave the labor force. In
many countries, the implicit tax on work is 80 percent or more the ﬁrst year
after beneﬁt eligibility.
This feature of plan provisions is related to a technical term called actu-
arial adjustment. In the United States, for example, if beneﬁts are taken at
64 instead of 65, they are reduced just enough to oﬀset the receipt of ben-
eﬁts for one additional year. If they are taken at 63 instead of 65 they are
reduced just enough to oﬀset the receipt of beneﬁts of two additional years,
and so forth.2 Under some plan provisions, there is no actuarial adjust-
ment. The importance of this feature is stressed in the following discussion.
A third, important feature of social security systems is that in many Eu-
ropean countries disability insurance and special unemployment pro-
grams essentially provide early-retirement beneﬁts before the oﬃcial social
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2. Under current law, beneﬁts in the United States are actuarially fair between 62 and 65,
but are increased less than actuarially if the receipt of beneﬁts is delayed beyond age 65, thus
providing an incentive to leave the labor force at 65. Beneﬁts will eventually become actuari-
ally fair after age 65 as well.security early retirement age. Figure I.4 shows the proportion of men col-
lecting disability beneﬁts by age in seven of the countries.3 At age 45, the
proportion of men collecting disability beneﬁts is rather close in all of the
countries; the range is from 2 to 5 percent in all of the countries except the
Netherlands, where the rate is 8 percent. At age 64, however, the range is
from about 7 percent in Spain and the United States to over 37 percent in
Sweden.4 In each of the countries with very high proportions, the rate es-
sentially falls to zero at the normal retirement age, which is 65 in Sweden,
the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Germany, and 60 in France.
At the normal retirement age, beneﬁts are obtained from country social se-
curity programs rather than disability programs. It is evident that the re-
ceipt of beneﬁts from a disability program does not always indicate that a
person is physically disabled.
Figure I.5 shows the pathways to retirement in Germany from 1960 to
1995. It is clear that the proportion of persons retiring at the normal re-
tirement age (65) declined substantially over this period, while the propor-
tion retiring under disability and unemployment programs and under the
social security early-retirement program (age 63) increased correspond-
ingly. In Germany, many employees retire as early as age 57, under a dis-
ability program. In 1995, 65 percent of men retired under a disability or
special unemployment program. Where these programs are important they
are incorporated into the social security incentive calculations. Appendix
table IA.1 provides a brief summary of the programs accounted for in each
country. In addition, Appendix table IA.2 provides a selected summary of
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Fig. I.4 Proportion of men collecting disability beneﬁts, by age
3. To reduce the complexity of the ﬁgure, data are shown only for selected countries.
4. The data for Italy are similar to the data for Spain. The rates for Belgium and Canada are
similar, and follow a path approximately midway between the path for the United States and
the path for Germany.the data ﬁles used in each country. For more detail, the country papers
must be consulted.
Retirement Incentives and Labor Force Participation
To summarize the social security incentive to retire in each country we
proposed a simple measure. At each age, beginning with the early retire-
ment age, the implicit tax on work was calculated in each country. These
implicit tax rates on work were then summed, beginning with the early re-
tirement age and running through age 69. This measure we called the tax
force to retire. The sum is shown for each of the countries in ﬁgure I.6. This
tax force to retire ranges from over 9 in Italy to about 1.5 in the United
States.
The Tax Force to Retire and Unused Labor-Force Capacity
The key ﬁnding from Phase I of the project is shown in ﬁgures I.7 and I.8.
Figure I.7 shows the relationship between the tax force to retire and un-
used labor force capacity—the proportion of men between ages 55 and 65
that is out of the labor force. It is clear that there is a very strong corre-
spondence between the two. Figure I.8 shows the same data for all of the
countries except Japan, and rescales the tax force measure to achieve a lin-
ear relationship between the tax force to retire and unused labor force ca-
pacity. The relationship between the two is perhaps even more evident. The
proportion of variation in unused labor force capacity that is explained by
the tax force to retire is 86 percent (as indicated by the R-squared value).
The results of the ﬁrst phase were reported in Gruber and Wise (1999b).
The introduction (Gruber and Wise 1999a, 34–35) concluded this way:
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Fig. I.5 Germany: Pathways to retirement for men, 1960 to 1995Fig. I.6 Sum of tax rates on work from early retirement age to 69
Fig. I.7 Unused capacity versus tax force to retireThe populations in all industrialized countries are aging rapidly and
individual life expectancies are increasing. Yet older workers are leaving
the labor force at younger and younger ages. In several countries in our
study, participation rates for men 60 to 64 have fallen from over 70 per-
cent in the early 1960s to less than 20 percent now. This decline in labor
force participation magniﬁes population trends, further increasing the
number of retirees relative to the number of persons who are working.
Together these trends have put enormous pressure on the ﬁnancial sol-
vency of social security systems around the world. Ironically, we argue,
the provisions of the social security systems themselves typically con-
tribute to the labor force withdrawal.
It is clear that there is a strong correspondence between the age at
which beneﬁts are available and departure from the labor force. Social
security programs often provide generous retirement beneﬁts at young
ages. In addition, the provisions of these programs often imply large ﬁ-
nancial penalties on labor earnings beyond the social security early re-
tirement age. Furthermore, in many countries disability and unemploy-
ment programs eﬀectively provide early retirement beneﬁts before the
oﬃcial social security early retirement age. We conclude that social se-
curity program provisions have indeed contributed to the decline in the
labor force participation of older persons, substantially reducing the po-
tential productive capacity of the labor force. It seems evident that if the
trend to early retirement is to be reversed, as will almost surely be dic-
tated by demographic trends, changing the provisions of social security
programs that induce early retirement will play a key role.
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Fig. I.8 Unused capacity versus tax force to retirePhase II
The ﬁrst stage of the project established two key results: (1) that the so-
cial security systems in many countries provide enormous incentives to
leave the labor force at older ages; and (2) that there is a strong correspon-
dence between social security incentives to retire and the withdrawal of
older workers from the labor force. The relationships in the ﬁrst volume,
however, did not provide a means of estimating the magnitude of the eﬀect
on labor force participation of changes in plan provisions.
The goal of the second phase of the project was to estimate how much
the retirement age would change if social security provisions were changed.
This analysis was based on within-country analysis of the determinants of
retirement, considering the relationship between retirement and the incen-
tives faced by individual employees. That is, rather than considering sys-
temwide incentives for representative persons (such as those with median
earning histories), and comparing these incentives to aggregate labor force
participation across countries, we turned to microeconometric analyses
within countries. The results of these analyses are based on diﬀerences in
individual circumstances within a given country. Persons in a given coun-
try who are similar in many respects face quite diﬀerent retirement incen-
tives. It is these diﬀerences in retirement incentives—among otherwise
similar persons—and the corresponding diﬀerences in individual retire-
ment decisions that are used to determine the eﬀect of the incentives on
retirement.
In Phase II, the investigators in each country put together large micro-
data ﬁles that combined information on individual retirement decisions
with retirement incentives (together with other individual data). Individ-
ual measures of social security retirement incentives—which vary sub-
stantially within a country—were calculated based on the methods devel-
oped for the ﬁrst phase of the project. A key incentive measure was the
option value of delayed retirement. This forward-looking measure is based
on the potential gain (or loss) in wage earnings plus social security wealth
if receipt of beneﬁts is delayed. The ﬁnancial value of retiring at the current
age is compared with the age at which the ﬁnancial value is the greatest,
which could be the current age or could be many years in the future. That
is, this constructed economic variable describes the ﬁnancial gain or loss
from continuing to work. Estimation using this measure goes back to the
procedure Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b) used to analyze the eﬀect on re-
tirement of employer-provided deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans in the United
States. Estimates were also obtained based on the related peak value mea-
sure proposed by Coile and Gruber (2001), which is based on the potential
gain (or loss) in social security wealth only if receipt of beneﬁts is delayed.
Although the focus of the analysis is on forward-looking measures of the
Introduction 11incentive to retirement—or for continued work—a natural starting point
is a measure that looks ahead only one year, the single-year accrual mea-
sure. This measure captures the eﬀect of another year of work on future
beneﬁts. Thus, as a base for comparison, the country analyses present the
single-year accrual incentive measure as well.
As in the ﬁrst phase, the analysis in each country followed a detailed
template, so that results could be compared across countries. The micro-
analysis in each country is based on a sample of individuals. In some cases,
the data come largely from administrative records, while in other cases, the
data were obtained from special surveys. The coverage is not precisely the
same in each country. Nonetheless, it was possible to estimate the same
models in each country, even though the population covered by the coun-
try data sets diﬀered in some respects.
The key advantage of the microestimation is that in each country the
eﬀects of changes in plan provisions could be predicted. A second key fea-
ture of the microanalyses is that they allow consideration of several fea-
tures of social security systems—as well as individual attributes—that
may simultaneously aﬀect retirement decisions. In particular, the microes-
timation results make it possible to jointly estimate the eﬀect on retirement
of the age at which beneﬁts are ﬁrst available and the incentive to retire
once beneﬁts are available. Both of these features were shown in the ﬁrst
stage of the project to be important determinants of the age of retirement.
The analysis in Phase II, however, posed several estimation challenges.
Perhaps the most diﬃcult was to identify the eﬀect on retirement of the ﬁrst
eligibility age—in particular, to distinguish the eﬀect of the eligibility age
from the eﬀect of the incentive measure, given eligibility. This was an
important consideration, because a key empirical regularity across all
countries was that retirement before the ﬁrst eligibility age is rare and there
is typically a jump in retirement at successive eligibility ages, in particular
the age of ﬁrst eligibility. This empirical regularity is discussed in some de-
tail in the introduction to the Phase II volume (Gruber and Wise 2004a).
To address this and other identiﬁcation issues, each country estimated two
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the base retirement model with respect to age: 
a model including a linear age trend and a model including age-speciﬁc
dummy variables.
Parameter Estimates
The results in the second volume produced a striking ﬁnding: in virtually
every country, in virtually every speciﬁcation, the retirement incentives in-
herent in most social security programs are strongly related to departure
from the labor force. In ten of the twelve countries we studied, the incen-
tive measure eﬀects were uniformly negatively related to retirement (a
higher option value or peak value of continued work led to less retirement)
and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The results were robust to the use of
12 Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wiseboth linear age and age-dummy variables. In two of the countries, Italy and
Spain, the peak value and option value eﬀects were typically not signiﬁcant
and sometimes of the wrong sign.5 In these two countries, the single-year
accrual eﬀect is negative and signiﬁcantly related to retirement in four of
the six cases.
Thus, overall, we found the results from these twelve separate analyses
to be strikingly consistent. The incentives inherent in retirement income
programs are clear determinants of individual retirement behavior. The
estimates themselves strongly suggest a causal interpretation of the cross-
country results presented in our ﬁrst volume. The results point to an im-
portant relationship between incentive eﬀects and labor-force participa-
tion, independent of cultural diﬀerence among countries. The magnitudes
of the implied eﬀects are also very comparable across countries, as shown
by the simulations discussed in the following.
Simulations
To demonstrate the eﬀect of plan provisions on retirement, the estimates
for each country were used to simulate the eﬀect of three illustrative
changes in plan provisions. Two illustrative plan changes were simulated in
Phase II of the project, and a third was added in Phase III. All three are de-
scribed here:
(1) The Three-Year Reform in eligibility ages. This illustrative simula-
tion increases all eligibility ages by three years, including the early retire-
ment age, the normal retirement age, and the ages of receipt of disability
beneﬁts—in countries in which disability, unemployment, or other retire-
ment pathways are important, the eligibility age for each of the programs
is delayed by three years.
(2) The Actuarial Reform. This reform reduces beneﬁts actuarially if
taken before the normal retirement age and increases beneﬁts actuarially if
taken after the normal retirement age.
(3) The Common Reform. This illustrative simulation is intended to
predict the eﬀect of the same reform (the common reform) in each country.
Under the Common Reform, the early retirement age is set at age 60 and
the normal retirement age at 65. Beneﬁts taken before age 65 are reduced
actuarially by 6 percent for each year before age 65. Beneﬁts taken after age
65 are increased by 6 percent for each year the receipt of beneﬁts is delayed.
In addition, the replacement rate at age 65 is set at 60 percent of (projected)
age 60 earnings.
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5. In the United Kingdom, the option value incentive measures are signiﬁcant when a boot-
strap method that accounts for repeated observations for the same person is used to calculate
standard errors. Also, in the United Kingdom, both the peak value and the option value in-
centive measures are very signiﬁcant—under conventional standard error estimates—when
cohort indicator, instead of age indictor, variables are used.It is clear that an increase in eligibility ages will typically increase labor-
force participation in each country. The implications of the Actuarial and
Common reforms are less obvious, so we illustrate their likely eﬀects across
diﬀerent countries, using the examples of Germany and the United States.
In Germany there was no actuarial adjustment before the 1992 reform
legislation, and until recently most employees still retired under provisions
that did not include actuarial adjustment. The magnitude of the combined
eﬀect of early retirement under the disability program in Germany and no
actuarial adjustment is illustrated conceptually in ﬁgure I.9. The oﬃcial
social security normal retirement age in Germany is 65. Suppose that at
that age, beneﬁts would be 100 units per year. Many employees can receive
beneﬁts at age 57 through the disability program. The disability beneﬁts at
57 are essentially the same as normal retirement beneﬁts at age 65. That is,
a person eligible for disability beneﬁts at age 57 who did not take the ben-
eﬁts at that age would forego 100 units per year. This results in a baseline
proﬁle of beneﬁts that starts at age 57 and remains ﬂat at 100 units per year.
On the other hand, suppose beneﬁts were reduced actuarially if taken
before age 65 and increased actuarially if taken after age 65. Then beneﬁts
taken at 57 would be about 60 instead of 100. Beneﬁts if taken at 70 would
be about 140 instead of 100. There would be no incentive to take beneﬁts
early. Indeed, there would be no social security incentive to take beneﬁts at
any speciﬁc age, once beneﬁts were available.
Figure I.10shows a comparable ﬁgure for the United States. In both coun-
tries, the normal retirement age is 65. Beneﬁts in the United States are ﬁrst
available at 62, however, compared to the common receipt of beneﬁts from a
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Fig. I.9 Germany: Base versus Actuarial Reformdisability program at age 57 in Germany. In addition, beneﬁts taken before
age 65 in the United States are reduced actuarially. Beneﬁts at 62 are 80 per-
cent of beneﬁts at 65. The increase in beneﬁts after age 65 is less than actu-
arially fair, however.6 Thus a reform to adjust beneﬁts actuarially in the
United States would have no eﬀect before age 65, and only a small eﬀect
thereafter. It should be clear from ﬁgures I.9 and I.10 that increasing the ﬁrst
eligibility age—without any actuarial adjustment—would increase labor
force participation in both countries, although the size of the eﬀect is likely
to be greater in Germany than in the United States because beneﬁts at the
ﬁrst eligibility age are much larger in Germany than in the United States. Un-
der this illustrative reform, in Germany beneﬁts would be zero at age 57, 58,
and 59. Beneﬁts would ﬁrst be available at age 60. In the United States, this
illustrative reform would increase the age of ﬁrst eligibility from 62 to 65.
Continuing to use a conceptual representation of social security provi-
sions in Germany as an example, ﬁgure I.11 shows the eﬀect of the Com-
mon Reform in Germany, and, for comparison, shows the Actuarial Re-
form as well. The Common Reform incorporates actuarial reduction in
beneﬁts before and actuarial increase in beneﬁts after the normal retire-
ment age, as described in ﬁgure I.9. In addition, the Common Reform in
Germany implies a substantial reduction in beneﬁts at the age 65 normal
retirement age. And, the Common Reform in Germany would increase the
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Fig. I.10 United States: Base versus Actuarial Reform
6. Under current legislation, the increase will be gradually increased to be actuarially fair
by 2008.age of ﬁrst eligibility by three years (and thus incorporate the three-year in-
crement in eligibility). In short, the receipt of beneﬁts is delayed from 57 to
60, beneﬁts at the normal retirement age are reduced from 100 to 75, and
normal retirement age beneﬁts are adjusted actuarially if taken before or
after the normal retirement age.
The diagram suggests that the combined eﬀect of these changes is likely
to be large in Germany. Beneﬁts before age 57 are no longer available.
When they are available at age 60, there is no ﬁnancial incentive to take
beneﬁts then as opposed to some later age, and when the normal retirement
age is reached there is no ﬁnancial incentive to take beneﬁts at that age as
opposed to some later age. (The following results show that the actuarial
reduction accounts for a large fraction of the labor force participation
eﬀect of the Common Reform in Germany.)
Figure I.12 is a conceptual representation of the Common Reform in the
United States. The Common Reform provides beneﬁts two years earlier than
the current early retirement age of 62. In addition, the Common Reform rep-
resents an approximately 33 percent increase in beneﬁts at the normal re-
tirement age. These two features of the Common Reform should be expected
to reduce the labor force participation of older workers in the United States.
(In addition, the Common Reform provides for an actuarially fair increase
in beneﬁts after age 65, which would provide some incentive to remain in the
labor force for persons who were still employed at ages older than 65.)
The cases of Germany and the United States are representative of the
other nations in our sample. Most European nations have a system similar
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Fig. I.11 Germany: Base, Three-Year Reform, Actuarial Reform, Common Reformto Germany’s, so that we would expect very large increases for them in la-
bor force participation from all of the reforms. Canada is more similar to
the United States, so that raising eligibility ages will raise labor force par-
ticipation, the Common Reform will lower participation, and the Actuar-
ial Reform will have little eﬀect.
In general, speciﬁc features of the current plan in each country suggest
how the Common Reform should change labor force participation in that
country. Thus, in part, the Common Reform is used to conﬁrm that the
simulation results, when compared across countries, conform to expecta-
tions based on current plan provisions.
Results
As emphasized previously, we made calculations based on two principle
estimation speciﬁcations—option value (OV) and peak value (PV)—and
three simulation methods. The three simulation methods are:
• S1: Use the retirement model with linear age.
• S2: Use the retirement model with age dummies, and assume that the
age dummies’ eﬀects purely represent a taste for leisure and do not
change when the system is reformed.
• S3: Use the retirement model with age dummies, and assume that the
deviation of age dummies from a linear age trend purely represents
eﬀects of the retirement system.
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Fig. I.12 United States: Base versus Common Reform18 Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise
Arguments can be made for all three approaches. The advantage of the ﬁrst
approach is that it allows us to remain neutral regarding the meaning of age-
speciﬁc retirement patterns, but at the risk of misspecifying the regression
model. But once age dummies are included, we do not know exactly
whether they should be interpreted as variations in taste for leisure by age
or as program eﬀects. Thus, in this section, we will rely on the results from
simulation approach S1, as a middle ground; the actual chapters in the sec-
ond and third volumes show the results from all simulation methods.
Three-Year Reform in Eligibility Ages and Labor Force Participation
The basic ﬁndings can be shown in two ﬁgures. Figure I.13 shows the
eﬀect of the Three-Year Reform in eligibility ages, based on the method that
we believe is most likely to reﬂect the long-run eﬀect of such a reform. To
help standardize for the wide variation across countries in the age at which
retirement begins, each bar shows the reduction in the fraction of the popu-
lation out of the labor force four years after the age at which a quarter of the
population has retired (which is an eﬀective retirement age). There are two
notable features of this ﬁgure. The ﬁrst is that the average reduction in the
out-of-labor force (OLF) proportion is very large—47 percent. The second
is the similarity across countries. The reduction is between 34 and 55 per-
cent in nine of the twelve countries. In Germany and Sweden, the reductions
are 77 and 68 percent, respectively. (The average reduction is 28 percent, us-
ing the simulation method that we believe is likely, on average, to substan-
tially underestimate the response to the Three-Year Reform.)
The Common Reform and Labor Force Participation
Figure I.14 shows the eﬀect on the OLF proportion of the Common
Reform. In this ﬁgure, it is clear that the greatest reductions in the OLF
proportion under the Common Reform are realized in the countries with
the youngest eﬀective retirement ages. For the six countries with substan-
tial retirement before age 60, the average reduction in the OLF proportion
is 44 percent. For the six countries in which most retirement is after age 60,
there is a 4 percent average increase in the OLF proportion.
The systematic pattern of these results shows a strong congruence with
intuition. For the six countries with the youngest eﬀective retirement ages,
the Common Reform represents a substantial increase in the youngest eli-
gibility age, and the actuarial reduction in most of these countries means
that beneﬁts at this age are much lower than under the base country plans.
Thus, for these countries, the OLF proportion should decline under the re-
form, and that is the case for every country but Canada. But for the six
countries with older retirement ages, the Common Reform may reduce the
earliest eligibility age—as in the United States—and may provide a greater
incentive to leave the labor force. In addition, the 60 percent replacement
rate at the normal retirement age represents an increase for some countries,Fig. I.13 OLF change 25 percent age   4 years, base versus 3-year delay: OV-S3
Fig. I.14 OLF change 25 percent age   4 years, base versus Common 
Reform: OV-S3such as the United States, but a reduction in the replacement rate for other
countries. Consequently, in three of these six countries, there is an increase
in the OLF proportion under the Common Reform simulation, and on av-
erage there is an increase in the OLF proportion. (The seemingly anom-
alous result for Canada is explained by the fact that Canada is the only
country in which the 25 percent age is below the nominal social security en-
titlement age; the 25 percent age is 58, while the social security entitlement
age is 60. In addition, Canada has relatively low beneﬁts at the early retire-
ment age (60). Thus, the Common Reform signiﬁcantly increases beneﬁt
levels, providing an additional inducement to retirement.)
A key reason for simulating the Common Reform was to determine
whether the results would correspond with intuition based on current plan
provisions. That the correspondence is close, we believe, helps to add cre-
dence to the estimation and simulation methods and to the overall results.
We concluded the introduction to this phase of the project (Gruber and
Wise 2004a, 35–36) with these comments:
The results of the country analyses reported in this volume conﬁrm the
strong causal eﬀect of social security program retirement incentives on la-
bor force participation. But perhaps more important, the results in this
volume show the large magnitude of these eﬀects. Across 12 countries with
very diﬀerent social security programs and labor market institutions, the
results consistently show that program incentives accord strongly with re-
tirement decisions. The magnitude of the estimated eﬀects varies from
country to country, but in all countries the eﬀects are large.
In short: the results in this volume provide an important complement
to the ﬁrst volume. The results leave no doubt that social security incen-
tives have a strong eﬀect on retirement decisions. And the estimates show
that the eﬀect is similar in countries with very diﬀerent cultural histories,
labor market institutions, and other social characteristics. While coun-
tries may diﬀer in many respects, the employees in all countries react sim-
ilarly to social security retirement incentives. The simulated eﬀects of
illustrative reforms reported in the country papers make clear that
changes in the provisions of social security programs would have very
large eﬀects on the labor force participation of older employees.
Phase III
Using the estimates from Phase II, Phase III of the project describes the
ﬁscal implications of changes in program provisions. What would be the ﬁ-
nancial implications of changing the provisions of social security systems?
Again, the results are demonstrated by simulating the ﬁscal eﬀects of illus-
trative reforms. In this phase, all three illustrative reforms described earlier
are simulated. In addition to the Three-Year Reform and the Common Re-
form, we also simulate separately an Actuarial Reform. As noted, in the
United States and in Canada, for example, beneﬁts taken before the early
20 Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wiseretirement age are reduced actuarially (so that, on average, beneﬁts re-
ceived over a lifetime do not depend on the age at which receipt of beneﬁts
begins), so that this simulation closely parallels existing law. In many Eu-
ropean countries, however, there is little or no actuarial reduction if bene-
ﬁts are taken early. This provides a very large incentive to leave the labor
force early, so that in many countries, moving to an actuarially fair system
can have very large ﬁscal implications.
The goal of the analysis in this phase is not to calculate the long-run bal-
ance sheets of a social security system, as is undertaken, for example, by the
United States Social Security Administration (SSA). Rather, the approach
taken here is to illustrate the ﬁscal implications by calculating the implica-
tions of reform for a speciﬁc cohort or for a group of cohorts. For example,
in the United States, the estimates show the ﬁscal implications of changes
in social security provisions for the cohort born between 1931 and 1941
(reaching age 65 between 1996 and 2006). The calculations in Phase III,
like those in Phases I and II, are made according to a detailed template so
that the results can be compared across countries.
In each country, the simulations proceed in several steps:
1. Using the retirement models estimated in Phase II of the project, pre-
dict the distribution of retirement ages under current law (the base case).
2. For this distribution of retirement ages, compute the ﬁscal position
of the cohort—total expected beneﬁts paid to the cohort and total ex-
pected taxes (both social security and other taxes) paid by the cohort.
3. Use the retirement models to predict the distribution of retirement
ages under a reform.
4. For the new distribution of retirement ages, compute the ﬁscal posi-
tion of the cohort.
5. Calculate the diﬀerence between ﬁscal positions under the base and
the reform systems to obtain the ﬁscal implication of reform.
6. Divide the ﬁscal implication into two components: The mechanical
eﬀect is the eﬀect of the reform assuming no behavioral response (change
in retirement ages) to the reform. The behavioral eﬀect is the additional in-
cremental eﬀect due to retirement response to the reform.
To illustrate the method used in each of the country papers, we describe
key calculations for two countries—the eﬀects of the reforms in Canada,
focusing on the Three-Year Reform, and eﬀects of the Actuarial Reform in
Germany. These examples also help to highlight how the details of the cur-
rent plan provisions, including the treatment of diﬀerent components of
the current system, inﬂuence the eﬀect on the illustrative reform. We then
show comparative results across countries.
Canada—Three-Year Reform
We illustrate the results presented in each paper using results for Canada
as an example. (Values are shown in Euros, converted from Canadian
Introduction 21dollars at the December 31, 2001, exchange rate—C$1.4185   €1.00). The
Canadian retirement system has three central components:
1. The Old Age Security (OAS) pension is a lump sum that is paid to all
citizens 65 and older. (It was $442.66 in March 2002 [€312.06] at the De-
cember 31, 2001 exchange rate.) The OAS is indexed to the CPI and is fully
taxable. (It also includes a “claw-back” provision for very high-income re-
cipients.)
2. The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) is an income-tested sup-
plement for low-income OAS beneﬁciaries. (In January to March 2002 it
was $526.08 for married couples and $342.67 for single persons [€370.85
and €241.57], respectively.) The GIS is indexed to the CPI and is not sub-
ject to income taxes. These beneﬁts are not adjusted actuarially.
3. The largest component of the social security system (called the In-
come Security System in Canada) is the combination of the Canada Pen-
sion Plan (CPP) and the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP). The actuarial reduc-
tion applies only to the CPP/QPP component, for which the normal
retirement age is 65 and the early retirement age is 60. The reduction rate
is 0.5 percent per month (6 percent per year), so that those retiring at 60 re-
ceive 70 percent of the age-65 beneﬁt. The CPP/QPP replaces at most 25
percent of preretirement income.
For this discussion, we focus on the Three-Year Reform but show key data
for the other reforms as well. The main results are shown in two tables in
each of the country papers. The example for Canada shows how these
tables are organized and how to interpret the entries.
Table I.1 shows the total eﬀect of each of the three reforms. As noted
earlier, reforms were simulated for each country using six methods—three
simulation approaches, each implemented based on the option value and
the peak value incentive measures. Here we show the results for the option
value model and for simulation method S1. Each of the country papers
presents a table with six panels—one for each of the estimation-simulation
methods—in which each panel looks like table I.1, shown here.
The ﬁrst four columns show the present discounted value (PDV) of ben-
eﬁts and taxes under the base plan and under each of the three illustrative
reforms. For example, the PDV of future beneﬁts payments under the base
plan is €111,084. Under the Three-Year Reform, the PDV is reduced to
€91,491. Total taxes under the base plan are €134,034, and are composed
of payroll taxes (15,182), income taxes (81,313), and consumption taxes
(37,540).7 Total taxes increase slightly, to €139,161 under the Three-Year
Reform.
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7. Consumption tax revenues are imputed based on the income associated with each pol-
icy. Payroll tax revenues include the share of general revenues that are associated with social
security programs, as imputed in each country.The last three columns show the total change relative to the base. For ex-
ample, the Three-Year Reform reduces beneﬁts by 17.6 percent and in-
creases tax receipts by 3.8 percent. The change in beneﬁts minus the change
in taxes (–19,593 – 5,127   –€24,720) is 22.3 percent of the base beneﬁt
costs (€111,084) of the program. This percentage is explicitly shown in
table I.2 and is the key result of the simulation.
The Actuarial Reform has no eﬀect in Canada because, as previously
mentioned, beneﬁts are adjusted actuarially under the base (current) plan,
so the Actuarial Reform is not a change. The Common Reform increases
program costs substantially in Canada, primarily because beneﬁts under
the Common Reform are much larger than current beneﬁts in Canada.
Table I.2 shows the total eﬀect of the reform, shown in table 1, decom-
posed into mechanical and behavioral components. Again, each of the
country papers presents a second key table with six panels, and each of the
panels is organized like table I.2. The mechanical component is the eﬀect
of the reform, assuming no behavioral—labor force participation—re-
sponse to the reform. The behavioral component is the additional incre-
mental eﬀect resulting from the labor force supply response to the reform.
For example, the Three-Year Reform’s mechanical eﬀect reduces beneﬁts
by €19,452. The behavioral response—a substantial increase in the typical
retirement age—in fact reduces beneﬁts a bit more. (This apparent anom-
aly is the result of speciﬁc features of the Canadian social security system
and is explained subsequently.) The mechanical eﬀect reduces total taxes
by €4,753 (and is also explained later). The behavioral eﬀect—prolonging
participation in the labor force—leads to an increase in taxes of €9,905.
The total eﬀect on taxes is an increase of €5,127. The net change in bene-
ﬁts minus tax revenues is –€24,720, which is equivalent to 22.3 percent of
the base (current) cost of the program. This change as a percentage of base
beneﬁts is perhaps the single best summary of the eﬀect of the illustrative
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Table I.1 Canada illustration: Total ﬁscal eﬀect of reform—OV-S1
Present discounted value Total change relative to base (%)
Three-Year Actuarial Common Three-Year Actuarial Common 
Cost or revenue item Base Reform Reform Reform Reform Reform Reform
Beneﬁts 111,084 91,491 111,084 187,796 –17.60 0.00 69.10
Taxes
Payroll 15,182 16,821 15,182 12,537 10.80 0.00 –17.40
Income 81,313 85,075 81,313 93,608 4.60 0.00 15.10
Consumption 37,540 37,265 37,540 41,314 –0.70 0.00 10.10
Total 134,034 139,161 134,034 147,459 3.80 0.00 10.00
Notes:The ﬁrst four columns show the PDV of beneﬁts and taxes under the base plan and under each of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.reform. Comparable percentages apply to each of the reforms in each of
the countries and are used in the following discussion to provide cross-
country comparisons.
A series of ﬁgures helps to explain the results in tables I.1 and I.2, focus-
ing on the Three-Year Reform. Figure I.15 shows the present discounted
value of social security wealth by age of retirement, under the base plan
and under the Three-Year Reform. Beneﬁts taken at any age are lower un-
der the Three-Year Reform. There are two reasons for the pattern across
ages. First, the age-65 normal retirement age under the base plan is in-
creased to 68 under the Three-Year Reform. Thus, beneﬁts taken at 55, for
example, are lower under the Three-Year Reform because they are dis-
counted actuarially from 68 to 55 instead of from 65 to 55. Second, while
the CPP and QPP are actuarially adjusted, so that receiving them later does
not aﬀect their PDV, the GIS and OAS are not. So if the age of receipt of
these programs is delayed, the PDV of beneﬁts at all ages is lowered.
Figure I.16 shows the relationship between total taxes and retirement
age. Taxes increase sharply with age, but at any age of exit from the labor
force, taxes are less under the Three-Year Reform. This is because the OAS
component of the social security beneﬁt—which is taxable—is received for
three fewer years under the Three-Year Reform. Thus, prolonging labor
force participation yields increased tax revenues from taxes on the in-
creased wage earnings. But this increase is partially oﬀset by the reduction
in future taxable social security beneﬁts under the Three-Year Reform.
Figure I.17 shows the distribution of retirement ages under the base and
under the Three-Year Reform. The upward shift in the distribution is clear.
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Fig. I.15 Canada: SSW by age of labor force exitThe behavioral component of beneﬁts and taxes reported in table I.2 is due
to this upward shift in retirement ages.
Figure I.18shows how the total eﬀect reported in table I.2 arises, by con-
sidering the change in expected totals by age. The bars labeled total bene-
ﬁtsshow the change in expected beneﬁts, by age. For example, the expected
payment to persons at age 55 is lower because fewer persons retire at this
age and because they receive lower payments, as shown in ﬁgure I.15. The
expected payment of beneﬁts to persons age 64 or older, however, is in-
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Fig. I.17 Canada: Distribution of labor force exit ages, OV-S1 model
Fig. I.16 Canada: Total taxes by age of labor force exitcreased under the Three-Year Reform. Even though the beneﬁt per person
is lower under the Three-Year Reform, more people retire at these ages,
leading to an increase in the expected payment to these older persons. Ag-
gregated over all ages—weighted by the proportion of persons retiring at
each age—the reduction is €19,593, shown under beneﬁts total in table I.2.
The lighter bars show the change in the expected beneﬁt payments by
age, less the expected tax revenues of persons who retire at each age. Ex-
pected beneﬁts minus tax revenues are lower at each age under the Three-
Year Reform. The reduction in the expected value of beneﬁts minus taxes
is less than the reduction in beneﬁts at younger ages because persons who
retire at these ages pay lower taxes on future social security beneﬁts than
they used to, as explained with reference to ﬁgure I.15. Nonetheless, there
is a net gain to the government budget. The important feature shown by
this ﬁgure is that even at older ages—at which the expected beneﬁts are in-
creased under the Three-Year Reform, because more persons are retiring
at these ages—the added taxes paid by these persons when they are work-
ing more than oﬀset the greater expected beneﬁts paid to persons at these
ages. The net reduction in beneﬁts minus taxes across all retirement ages is
€24,720, as shown in table I.2.8
Finally, ﬁgure I.19 shows the ﬁscal eﬀect of the Three-Year Reform as a
percentage of GDP. This ﬁgure shows the estimated eﬀect for each of the
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Fig. I.18 Canada: Total eﬀect of Three-Year Reform by age of retirement, 
OV-S1 model
8. The sum over the values in the ﬁgure is not exactly 24,720. Figure 18 shows the average
beneﬁts and taxes at each age (ﬁgure I.16) times the average retirement rates at each age (ﬁg-
ure I.17). The 24,720 in table I.2 comes from taking each individual in the sample and multi-
plying beneﬁts and taxes by probabilities of retirement, and then taking the average. The bars
in ﬁgure I.18 sum to 24,193.six methods used to obtain estimates. The reduction in government bene-
ﬁts payments minus revenues ranges from about .30 to .45 percent of GDP,
depending on the estimation method.
Figures like those for Canada are shown in each of the country papers,
but the ﬁgures that the country authors have selected to show vary from
country to country. Tables showing results like those in tables I.1 and I.2,
however, are shown for each country.
Germany—Actuarial Reform
Germany has a very generous social security system, with very strong in-
centives to retire early. In addition to the social security program per se, a
large fraction of workers in Germany retire through disability and unem-
ployment programs, as previously described. These programs essentially
provide early-retirement beneﬁts before the age-60 social security early
retirement age. Indeed, these programs provide the principle path to re-
tirement in Germany. And as described earlier, once beneﬁts are available,
there is no actuarial reduction in beneﬁts taken before the age-65 normal
retirement age (although recent reforms have introduced some actuarial
reduction). For example, early retirement beneﬁts taken at age 60, or ben-
eﬁts from the disability program taken at age 57, are the same as the age-65
normal retirement beneﬁts. This provides an enormous incentive to take
beneﬁts when they are ﬁrst available. If they are not taken, they are simply
lost; there is no oﬀsetting increase in beneﬁts if they are received for fewer
years.
Suppose that beneﬁts in Germany were actuarially fair, so that beneﬁts
received prior to age 65 were reduced by 6 percent per year, and beneﬁts re-
ceived after 65 were increased 6 percent per year. What would be the ﬁscal
implications of such a change? Table I.3 shows the eﬀect of this change on
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Fig. I.19 Canada: Fiscal implication of Three-Year Reform as percent of GDP, by
estimation methodthe mean retirement age for the sample of workers used in the analysis. The
mean retirement age for men under the current provisions is 61.91. The
base simulation yields a mean retirement age very close to the sample
mean. The actuarially fair reduction in beneﬁts is estimated to increase the
retirement age by about three years, for both men and women. Figure I.20
shows the change in the distribution of retirement ages for men; there is a
clear shift to older ages throughout the distribution.
The ﬁscal implications of this change are shown in table I.4. As de-
scribed previously, the total eﬀect of the reform is decomposed into two
parts—the mechanical eﬀect that would exist if retirement ages did not
change, and the behavioral eﬀect that is due to change in retirement ages.
Beneﬁts received at any age less than 65 are reduced by the actuarial re-
duction. If there were no change in retirement ages, the average beneﬁt per
worker would be reduced by €37,056. But the behavioral response to the re-
form increases the average retirement age, as shown in table I.3 and ﬁgure
I.20. This increases the average beneﬁt by €19,632. The total (net) eﬀect on
beneﬁts is a reduction of €17,423.
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Table I.3 German illustration: Eﬀect of actuarial reduction in beneﬁts on
retirement age—OV model
Model Men Women
Sample frequencies 61.91 61.73
Base simulation 62.05 62.01
Actuarially fair simulation 65.18 64.57
Fig. I.20 Germany: Distribution of retirement ages for base and Actuarial Reform,
OV-S1 methodIn addition to the change in beneﬁts, the reform has further ﬁscal impli-
cations. Contributions to the social security system are increased if em-
ployees continue to work. This behavioral eﬀect is  €16,766.
In addition, if employees work longer, they pay more in other taxes. The
total increase in taxes is €49,049 per worker (including taxes for health and
other insurance programs, income taxes, and VAT tax). The net change in
beneﬁts minus the change in contributions and taxes is –€83,238. This net
reduction in the total government beneﬁt payments minus revenues is
equivalent to 42.85 percent of base beneﬁts under the current system. The
ﬁscal eﬀect of the reform as a percent of GDP is shown in ﬁgure I.21, which
shows the estimated eﬀect for each of six estimation and simulation meth-
ods. On balance, the reduction in beneﬁts minus all taxes is about 1.2 per-
cent of GDP.
Cross-Country Comparisons
Calculations like those illustrated for Canada and Germany were made
by each of the country teams for each of the three illustrative reforms. As
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Fig. I.21 Germany: Fiscal implications of Actuarial Reform as percentage of 2001
GDP, by estimation method
Table I.4 German Illustration: Fiscal implications of Actuarial Reform—Change
in PDV, euros per worker (OV model, dummies shifted)
Mechanical eﬀect Behavioral eﬀect Total eﬀect
Beneﬁts –37,056 19,632 –17,423
Contribution 0 16,766 16,766
All taxes –1,558 50,608 49,049
Net change –35,497 –47,741 –83,238
% change –18.27 –24.58 –42.85the illustrations highlight, the eﬀect of each of the reforms depends on the
provisions of the current system in each country. An increase in eligibility
ages is expected to reduce expenditures and increase tax revenues in all
countries. But even in this case, the added tax revenue from increased la-
bor-force participation can be at least partly oﬀset by lower taxes resulting
from lower future social security beneﬁts, as in Canada. The Actuarial Re-
form, which has large eﬀects in Germany, should have little eﬀect in coun-
tries like the United States and Canada, where the system is already actu-
arially fair.
Results across all countries are shown in the next ﬁve ﬁgures. Like the re-
sults for the ﬁrst two phases of the project, these results are taken from the
individual country papers. For these comparisons, we use the estimates
based on the option value speciﬁcation and simulation method S3—some-
times referred to as OV-S3, or as option value-age dummies shifted. The
ﬁgures show the total ﬁscal eﬀect of the reforms. To reduce complexity, the
ﬁgures do not divide the total eﬀect into the mechanical and the behavioral
components that can be seen in the country papers. The behavior eﬀects of
the Three-Year Reform in eligibility ages and of the Common Reform on
labor force participation are shown in ﬁgures I.13 and I.14, respectively.
Figure I.22shows the total ﬁscal eﬀect of the Three-Year Reform in eligi-
bility ages. For example, in Germany, the reduction in government beneﬁt
payments minus the increase in tax revenues—resulting from a three-year
increment in all eligibility ages—would be equivalent to about 36 percent
of the current cost of the program. Across all countries, the average de-
crease in government beneﬁt payments minus tax revenues is equivalent to
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Fig. I.22 Total ﬁscal eﬀect of Three-Year Reform, as percentage of base cost27 percent of current program cost. The anomalous positive total ﬁscal
eﬀect in Denmark is due to the replacement of three years of Old Age Pen-
sion beneﬁts with beneﬁts from a more generous early retirement program.
Figure I.23 shows the decrease in government beneﬁt payments minus
tax revenues—resulting from the Three-Year Reform—as a percent of
gross domestic product. The average decrease over all countries is equiva-
lent to 0.97 percent of GDP and is greater than 0.50 percent or greater in
all but two of the countries—again reported as a reduction in government
beneﬁt payments minus tax revenues.
Figure I.24 shows the ﬁscal eﬀect of the Actuarial Reform as a percent-
age of base cost. As expected, there is large variation across countries. As
noted earlier, in the United States and Canada, where adjustment is al-
ready close to actuarial, the eﬀect is small. In Germany, where until re-
cently there was no actuarial adjustment, the eﬀect is very large, as ex-
plained in detail previously.
In France, the actuarial increase in beneﬁts after the age-60 early retire-
ment age would prolong participation in the labor force and would in-
crease beneﬁts for many retirees. The early retirement age in France is 60
and the normal retirement age depends on the number of validated partic-
ipation quarters. (The normal retirement age is the minimum of 65 and is
the age at which a person attains 150 validated quarters.) But under the
current system there is no actuarial adjustment of beneﬁts if they are taken
after the age of ﬁrst eligibility, and the reduction in beneﬁts if they are taken
before the normal retirement age is greater than actuarially fair. For per-
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Fig. I.23 Total ﬁscal eﬀect of Three-Year Reform, as percentage of GDPsons with more than 150 validated quarters, the actuarial upward adjust-
ment of beneﬁts after age 60 would increase their pension beneﬁts. The re-
duction in beneﬁts if taken with less than 150 quarters is less under the Ac-
tuarial Reform. So both the behavioral and the mechanical eﬀects of the
Actuarial Reform increase the cost of beneﬁts.
On average, across all countries the decrease in government expenditure
minus revenue is equivalent to about 26 percent of the base cost—reported
as a reduction in government beneﬁt payments minus tax revenues. Be-
cause of particular features of the current system in the United Kingdom,
the Actuarial Reform has not been simulated for that country.
Figure I.25 shows the ﬁscal eﬀect of the Common Reform as a percent-
age of base cost. In accord with intuition, the total net government revenue
as a percent of program base cost varies greatly. In the United States, for
example, beneﬁts under the Common Reform are more generous than cur-
rent beneﬁts and, are available at age 60 instead of the current age-62 early
retirement age. Also, in the United Kingdom, the Common Reform bene-
ﬁts are much more generous than current beneﬁts, and the age-60 early re-
tirement age is younger than the current early retirement age for some par-
ticipants.
Figure I.26shows the ﬁscal eﬀects of each of the reforms on the same ﬁg-
ure, ordered by the eﬀect of the Common Reform. This ﬁgure helps to em-
phasize the sometimes intricate relationship between current plan provi-
sions and the eﬀects of the illustrative reforms. In the United States and
Canada, for example, the Three-Year Reform reduces (net) program costs.
The Actuarial Reform has essentially no eﬀect in Canada, where the
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Fig. I.24 Total ﬁscal eﬀect of Actuarial Reform, as percentage of base costFig. I.26 Total ﬁscal eﬀect of Three-Year Reform, Actuarial, and Common Re-
forms, as percentage of base cost
Fig. I.25 Total ﬁscal eﬀect of Common Reform, as percentage of base costsystem is already actuarial, and little eﬀect in the United States, where the
system is close to actuarial. But in both of these countries the Common Re-
form provides higher beneﬁts than provided by their current system, and in
the United States, beneﬁts are available two years earlier than the current
early retirement age. Thus, the Common Reform substantially increases
program costs in these countries.
Another example: in France, the Three-Year Reform would reduce net
program costs. The actuarial adjustment alone would increase beneﬁt pay-
ments, as previously described. But the Common Reform provides much
lower beneﬁts than the current system in France. In addition, the Common
Reform sets the normal retirement age at 65, and beneﬁts are actuarially
reduced between 65 and the age-60 early retirement age. Thus, on balance,
the Common Reform implies a substantial reduction in net program cost
in France.
Although not detailed in this introduction, the results for each of the
countries are determined by the precise relationships between the current
plan provisions and the illustrative reform.
Conclusions: Looking Back and Going Forward
Our introduction to Phase I of the project emphasized the striking rela-
tionship across countries between social security program incentives to re-
tire and the proportion of older persons out of the labor force (ﬁgures I.7
and I.8). The weight of the evidence, we judged, was that the relationship
was largely causal.
The results of the country analyses reported in Phase II of the project—
based on within-country analysis of microdata—conﬁrmed the strong
causal eﬀect of social security program retirement incentives on labor force
participation and showed the large magnitude of these eﬀects. The results
left no doubt that social security incentives have a strong eﬀect on retire-
ment decisions. Across twelve countries, the results consistently showed
that program incentives strongly accord with retirement decisions. The
magnitude of the estimated eﬀects varies from country to country, but in
all countries the eﬀects were found to be large. And the estimates show that
the eﬀect is similar in countries with very diﬀerent cultural histories, labor
market institutions, and other social characteristics. While countries may
diﬀer in many respects, employees in all countries react similarly to social
security retirement incentives. The simulated eﬀects of illustrative reforms
reported in the country papers made clear that changes in the provisions of
social security programs would have very large eﬀects on the labor force
participation of older employees.
In this phase of the project, we built on the estimates obtained in the
second phase to analyze the ﬁscal implications of program provisions. In
particular, we estimated the ﬁnancial implications of three illustrative
Introduction 35program reforms. The results make clear that reforms like those considered
in this volume can have very large ﬁscal implications for the cost of social
security beneﬁts as well as for government revenues engendered by changes
in the labor force participation of older workers.
On average, across the twelve countries, we judge that a three-year in-
crease in program eligibility ages would reduce government beneﬁts pay-
ments minus tax revenues by 27 percent of current program cost. The av-
erage reduction is approximately 0.72 percent of country GDP. While the
estimates vary by method of estimation—as reported in each of the coun-
try papers—we believe that these averages reﬂect the most likely long-run
eﬀect of the illustrative reforms. Actuarial reform alone would have a very
large eﬀect in some countries—reducing net government cost by over 40
percent in ﬁve countries—depending on the extent of actuarial adjustment
to beneﬁts under the current program provisions.
In the second phase of the project, we used estimates of the labor force
participation eﬀects of the Common Reform to judge the plausibility of the
estimates. In this third phase we estimated the ﬁscal implication of the
Common Reform. Again, we ﬁnd that the results accord strongly with in-
tuition, based on the provisions of the current plans. In accord with intu-
ition, the Common Reform yields both increases and reductions in gov-
ernment revenue equivalent to a large fraction of current program costs.
We believe that this adds credence to the methods used for estimation of
the ﬁscal eﬀects of the illustrative reforms.
In short, the ﬁscal eﬀects of reform can be very large. Some combination
of increases in the early retirement age, actuarial adjustment of beneﬁts,
and change in the beneﬁt level can change net government revenue sub-
stantially. In many countries, the illustrative reforms simulated by the par-
ticipants in this project yield reductions in government beneﬁt payments
minus tax revenues equivalent to 20 to 50 percent of current program cost.
Finally, having emphasized the potential for changes in plan provisions
to increase the labor force participation of older workers and to relieve the
ﬁnancial pressure on social security systems, we consider how such
changes in social security systems may already be having an eﬀect in some
countries. Figure I.27, panels A and B, is the same as ﬁgure I.2, panels A
and B, but it has been updated to include labor force participation rates of
men from about 1995 to about 2003. In many of the countries there seems
to be a clear reversal in the decline in labor force participation. In some
countries the reversal can be traced to changes in social security provi-
sions, while in others it seems to be associated with economy-wide trends
in labor market conditions.
Consider Denmark ﬁrst. Except for updating the series, the only other
change is the addition of data for Denmark, which was added to the proj-
ect after the ﬁrst phase. In 1999, the Post Employment Wage (PEW) pro-
gram was changed to provide incentives to stay in the labor force until age
36 Jonathan Gruber and David A. WiseFig. I.27 LFP trends for men 60 to 64, updated
A
B62. (When the PEW program was introduced, in 1979, it induced an al-
most-immediate drop of 17 percentage points in the labor force participa-
tion rate of men 60 to 64.)
In Sweden, the explanation for the increase in the labor force participa-
tion of men 60 to 64 lies primarily in changes in the eligibility requirement
for the disability program. The provision that unemployed workers older
than age 60 were eligible for a disability pension was abolished in 1991, and
the provision that these unemployed workers were eligible because of a
combination of medical and labor market reasons was abolished in 1997.
The most important change was likely the 1995 provision that enabled the
social security administration to reconsider the right to a disability pen-
sion. Consistent with these changes, from 1993 to 2002 the percentage of
men aged 60 to 64 with a disability pension was reduced from 30 to 23 per-
cent. In addition, the Swedish economy has recovered from the 1990s re-
cession that limited labor force demand.
In Germany, the reversal of the downward trend in the labor force par-
ticipation of men 60 to 64 that began in 1997 coincides with the introduc-
tion of partial actuarial reduction in beneﬁts taken before the early retire-
ment age. In the United States, the downward trend was reversed about
1995. While the reason for the reversal is unclear, it seems likely that the de-
cline in employer-provided deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans—with strong
incentives to retire early—and the rapid spread of personal retirement
plans—with no retirement incentive eﬀects—has been part of the expla-
nation.
In the United Kingdom there has been a general increase in labor force
participation rates at all ages, but there was no apparent change in social
security plan provisions that might have led to an increase for men 60 to 64.
In Canada there were no changes in social security provisions that could
account for the increase in the labor force participation of men 60 to 64.
There was, however, a general improvement in labor market conditions af-
ter the mid-90s, with a fall in the overall unemployment rate from 10.4 per-
cent in 1995 to 7.6 percent in 2003. In Spain, the reforms during the 1997
to 2002 period did not substantially change the retirement incentives faced
by older workers. There was, however, a large increase in the labor force—
from about 12.5 million in 1995 to over 17 million in 2004—apparently due
to an increase in the demand for labor. And during this period, labor force
participation increased from 50.8 to 55.7 percent.
We do not yet have a succinct explanation for the increase in the labor-
force participation in The Netherlands. Early retirement provisions in The
Netherlands are the result of collective bargaining by sector, or even by
ﬁrm, and hence it is hard to easily identify and summarize changes in plan
provisions.
Thus far in the project, we have considered the early retirement incen-
tives inherent in many social security programs, the reduction in the labor
38 Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wiseforce participation of older workers induced by these penalties on work,
and the consequent ﬁnancial implications of the induced early retirement.
Going forward, we will direct our attention to several new issues, including
the relationship between social security system provisions and the well-
being of the elderly and the young, the relationship between social security
system provisions and the employment of the young, and how the rela-
tionship between health status and retirement varies with social security
(including disability) program provisions.
References
Coile, Courtney C., and Jonathan Gruber. 2001. Social security incentives for re-
tirement. In Themes in the economics of aging, ed. D. A. Wise, 311–41. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Gruber, Jonathan, and David A. Wise. 1999a. Introduction and summary. In So-
cial security programs and retirement around the world, ed. J. Gruber and D. A.
Wise, 73–100. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gruber, Jonathan, and David A. Wise, eds. 1999b. Social security and retirement
around the world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gruber, Jonathan, and David A. Wise. 2004a. Introduction and summary. In So-
cial security programs and retirement around the world: Micro-estimation, ed.
J. Gruber and D. A. Wise, 1–40. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gruber, Jonathan, and David A. Wise, eds. 2004b. Social security and retirement
around the world: Micro-estimation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Stock, James H., and David A. Wise. 1990a. The pension inducement to retire: An
option value analysis. In Issues in the economics of aging,ed. D. A. Wise, 205–24.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Stock, James H., and David A. Wise. 1990b. Pensions, the option value of work,
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dTable IA.2 Selected data sources, by country
Country Data sources Year
Belgium Fiscal Revenue Statistics (SFR) 1989–96
Individual Pension Account (CIP)
Census 1991
Canada Longitudinal Worker File (Statistics Canada)
Denmark Danish Integrated Database (IDA), 2% sample 1980–2001
France Echantillon Interrégime de Retraités (EIR) 1997
Annual declarations of social data (DADS)
Wage ﬁles for civil servants (State Service)
Unemployment ﬁles (UNEDIC)
Germany German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
Administrative data from German Association of Public 
Retirement
Insurance providers
Administrative data from German Department of Labor and 
Social Security (BMAS)
Italy Instituto Nazionale Pevidenza Sociale (INPS)-Workers archive 1973–97
Japan Survey on Labor Market Participation of Older Persons 1996
The Netherlands Netherlands Socioeconomic Panel (SEP) 1984–96
CentER Savings Survey 1997
Spain Administrative records from Spanish SSA (HLSS)
Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA)
Estadística de Convenios Colectivos
National accounts from Bank of Spain
Sweden Longitudinal Individual Data (LINDA)—based on Income and  Panel data
Wealth Register, Population Census, and National Social   1983–97
Insurance Board Registers
United Kingdom UK Retirement Survey (RS) Panel data
Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 1988–89, 1994
United States Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) 1951–91, 1992